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''That Vast Experiment'' 
The New Brunswick Militia's 1865 
Cam.p of Instruction 
J. Brent Wilson 
I n July 1865, almost 1,000 New Brunswick militiamen assembled in Fredericton for a 
twenty-four day Camp of Instruction. This was 
the first time peacetime militia training on this 
scale was ever attempted in British North 
America. At the time, and since, the camp was 
praised as a notable achievement. New 
Brunswick's lieutenant-governor and provincial 
commander-in-chief, Arthur Hamilton Gordon, 
wrote: "The entire success of this experiment is 
admitted with an unanimity which is remarkable, 
because rare in this Province. "1 Although the 
uniqueness of the camp has been the subject of 
some interest, it has never been subjected to 
more in-depth analysis. This article moves 
beyond generalizations to examine the purpose 
of the camp and what actually transpired. The 
Camp of Instruction tells us a great deal about 
the nature and character of New Brunswick's 
militia on the eve of Confederation, and its 
outcome helps to explain why the province 
moved toward political union as an answer to 
the inadequate state ofits defences. 
Revitalizing the Militia 
B y the early 1860s, the need to reform the late colonial militia system in New 
Brunswick was evident. Improved relations with 
the United States a decade earlier had led the 
provincial legislature to suspend those sections 
of the militia law affecting annual drills, making 
it impossible to carry out training. Interest in 
reviving the militia received a boost in the late 
1850s, when the growth of the volunteer 
movement in Britain and then British North 
America led to the formation of some 20 
Volunteer companies within the New Brunswick 
militia by the end of 1860. However, the threat 
of war with the United States resulting from their 
Civil War, especially after the Trent Crisis of 
1861-1862, and Britain's growing desire to 
withdraw from British North America made it 
obvious that the province had to strengthen its 
defences, particularly the effectiveness of the 
militia. The new lieutenant-governor, Arthur 
Gordon, spearheaded this effort.2 
When Gordon arrived in October 1861, the 
province's first line of defence against a possible 
invasion from the south was provided by British 
military forces. Royal Navy warships operating 
out of Halifax defended the coast while a British 
infantry battalion, split between Fredericton and 
Saint John, and Royal Artillery contingent based 
in Saint John, provided land defence, especially 
of the vital overland winter route that ran 
between Saint John and the St. Lawrence River. 
New Brunswick's contribution to its own defence 
was its militia system. At the time, it consisted 
of a small, underfunded Volunteer corps made 
up of various poorly organized and drilled 
companies; the county militia which existed 
mainly on paper and functioned more as a social 
club than a military force; and an inadequate 
headquarters staff. 
Drawing on his earlier experience as colonel 
of a Scottish Volunteer regiment, Gordon 
undertook several measures aimed at 
rejuvenating the militia system, including 
revamping the officer corps, especially among 
the Volunteers, and re-staffing headquarters. In 
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1862, Gordon oversaw passage of a new act 
designed to revive the militia. Among its chief 
features was the reorganization of the force into 
two basic categories: active (fit men between 18 
and 45) and sedentary (fit men between 45 and 
60). Each category was further divided into sub-
classes. In the case of the active force it consisted 
of Class A (the Volunteers), Class B (single men 
and widowers without children), and Class C 
(married men and widowers with children). The 
Volunteers, composed of an all-arms corps 
organized into companies, with short periods of 
training would be kept fit for active service. The 
remaining classes of the active militia would be 
mustered and enrolled one day a year. The 
sedentary militia represented simply a reserve 
of manpower; it would assemble only 
occasionally for enrollment and would be called 
out only in wartime. The new militia act would 
remain in effect for three years and then would 
have to be renewed. By placing the Volunteers at 
the centre of the revitalized militia, New 
Brunswick took the lead in militia reform among 
the British North American provinces with 
passage of the 1862 act. 3 Unfortunately, the 
militia appropriation attached to the bill was 
severely reduced by the government. 
Following passage of the law, Gordon 
undertook further reforms directed mostly at the 
Volunteer companies, including improving the 
quality of the officer corps, providing arms and 
facilities for drilling, and securing more financial 
aid for the Volunteers. By 1864, the Volunteers 
numbered some 1, 700 troops. They consisted 
of three troops of cavalry (one organized as 
hussars and the others as mounted infantry); 
seven batteries of artillery; one company of 
engineers, located in Saint John; and 21 
companies of infantry (six formed the Saint John 
Volunteer Battalion, and the other 15 were 
attached to the county battalions). 4 However, they 
remained confined mainly to urban areas, they 
were small in numbers (leaving aside the New 
Brunswick Regiment of Artillery, the Saint John 
Volunteers and the 1st Battalion of the York 
County Regiment from Fredericton, more than 
half the companies numbered fewer than 50 
men), and they were short of modern weapons 
and equipment, particularly field artillery. 5 
Despite these shortcomings, by 1864 Gordon 
was reasonably satisfied with the state of the 
Volunteer force. 6 
40 
The remainder of the active force, however, 
- the B and C Class men - continued to be a 
serious problem. Being called out only on muster 
day for enrolling, it had once again become a 
paper force, with many of the 38 battalions 
lacking officers. Gordon appointed some new 
officers and provided them with basic training, 
and organized annual call outs, but local political 
opposition to the militia appropriation and 
uneven popular support for militia service 
contributed to its ongoing ineffectiveness. 
Gordon pointed to the fundamental problem of 
implementing this militia system in a largely 
rural, agricultural province when he wrote: 
... to call the whole male population together for 
any long period, the rich merchant from his 
counting house- the needy settler from his half 
cleared farm - the lumberer from the woods -
the ploughman from the field- the boatman from 
the river, would be as oppressive as it is in fact 
impracticable. As it is, the pecuniary sacrifice 
entailed by one day's muster is greaU 
Gordon also faced pressure from another 
direction. By 1864, the issue of militia reform 
had taken on greater importance within the 
context of imperial politics, as the British 
government had begun pushing British North 
America more firmly toward political union and 
toward self-defence. 8 In spite of Gordon's efforts, 
Edward Cardwell, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, was dissatisfied with the state of the 
local force, writing in October 1864, that "the 
progress of the Militia in New Brunswick does 
not at present in any degree correspond with 
the spirit of patriotism and spirit of loyalty by 
which the inhabitants are known to be 
animated. "9 
Gordon replied with a lengthy despatch, 
detailing the measures he had taken over the 
last three years to re-organize both the 
Volunteers and militia. He went on to remind 
the Secretary that, although self-defence was an 
important provincial duty, 
it must be remembered that the very maintenance 
of self-existence imperatively requires the outlay 
of the greater part of the Provincial Revenue on 
objects and institutions which, in an older 
country, have been already established, or are 
maintained by private enterprise. 10 
Cardwell, somewhat mollified by this report, 
nevertheless again urged Gordon to move 
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New Brunswick militiamen parading beside the Fredericton Exhibition Building during the Camp of 
Instruction. Each soldier received a government-issued redfiannel tunic and blue flannel cap. but wore his 
own trousers and boots. which "did not always make for uniformity.·· 
forward with further reforms, informing the 
lieutenant-governor in December that "it must 
be borne in mind that self-defence is the first 
duty of every free people. "11 
With pressure from London mounting 
Gordon moved ahead with plans to revitalize the 
rest of the active militia. In January 1865, he 
assembled a commission, made up of senior 
militia officers, that recommended changes to 
the militia system. Foremost among these was a 
twenty-eight day Camp oflnstruction to be held 
annually for a representation of the active militia 
gathered from across the province. The force 
would be composed of 64-man companies drawn 
from each of the 36 battalions in the province, 
making a total of 2,204 troops. They would be 
composed of volunteers or if that proved 
inadequate of men selected by ballot. 12 
The purpose of the camp was left vague, the 
commission's report stating only that it "would 
be of permanent benefit to the Militia Force of 
this Province. "13 However, it was generally 
assumed that its purpose was to provide a select 
number of militiamen with intensive training 
under drill instructors and they would then 
return home to act as a cadre to improve the 
standard of training throughout the rest of their 
battalion. 14 Heartened by the commission's 
report, Gordon introduced several of the 
recommended changes in the new militia bill 
being prepared to replace that of 1862, which 
was due to expire, including the Camp of 
Instruction. 
The decision to hold this extended camp met 
with strong opposition both from local sources 
and from within official circles. The Fredericton 
newspaper, the New Brunswick Reporter, a 
staunch enemy of the govemment, described the 
camp as "this most outrageous measure," and 
opposed it for several reasons. Reacting to the 
method to be used for recruiting the troops, 
especially the provision for drafting by ballot, it 
stated: 
men will not submit to be forced from their 
homes, their business and their merchandise, 
in order to gratify a ridiculous whim of the 
belligerent Executive Council; and they have no 
idea of being placed in a Camp of wild and 
perhaps dissolute young men at a time when 
there is no necessity whatever, especially when 
it is to be feared that the instruction in immorality 
41 
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and drunkenness will be more rapid than in 
military drill and discipline. 
Moreover, it objected to recruiting from what it 
described as a "loose and floating population 
which, although it is here to-day may be away 
tomorrow." It feared that these "birds of passage" 
would not be available in an emergency or that 
in some cases they might use their military 
training against the state. 
The Reporter also argued against the scheme 
of drilling a select group of troops in a single 
place. 
If the young men now in Camp could on their 
return home be employed as so many drill 
instructors in their own districts, the system 
would work admirably; but this it is not 
pretended they will become and consequently 
whatever military advantage may be obtained on 
the present occasion can only be communicated 
by the commissioned officers in their several 
districts ... 
It would have been far better, it stated, if these 
officers had been assembled at headquarters and 
"under a thorough system of instruction so 
drilled as to render them competent to spread 
the military leaven throughout the whole 
Province." They supported the recommendation 
made by others within the province for a School 
of Instruction for militia officers as a more 
economical and effective option. 
Finally, the paper opposed the camp on 
financial grounds, arguing that in the current 
period of economic decline and given the 
"embarrassed" state of the province's finances, 
the "situation" facing the province did not 
warrant the expenditure of such a large sum of 
money. 15 
Perhaps more importantly, the British 
military also opposed the camp. Calling it "that 
vast experiment," Major General Sir Hastings 
Doyle, the Commander of the British Forces in 
the Lower Provinces, believed the funds might 
have been better used instructing a larger body 
of officers and men for a shorter period. Doyle's 
chief concern was that the militiamen would 
object to the discomfort of such prolonged 
service and the imposition of stricter military 
discipline. He feared that the experience would 
leave the men disgusted with the militia service. 16 
42 
The War Office in London also voiced similar 
concerns about the training scheme. Earl de 
Grey, the Secretary of State for War, referred the 
militia commission's recommendations to senior 
officers for their opinions. The Inspector General 
of Militia believed that it would be preferable to 
have the funds devoted to the annual training of 
the whole regiment for a lesser number of days. 
Similarly, the Inspector General of Volunteers 
wrote that, assuming the purpose of the camp 
was to obtain a sufficient number of trained men 
to act afterwards as drill instructors of the 
battalion, he believed it would have been better 
for the regulars to furnish the required 
instructors. Moreover, following the proposed 
plan would require several years to drill all the 
companies of the battalion, since only one would 
be instructed each year. 17 
These fears aside, the major source of 
concern was the limited availability of funds. As 
Gordon saw it, the alternative before the 
legislature was, 
whether they would call out a large body of men 
for a short time, or a smaller body for a more 
lengthened period. I think they chose wisely in 
determining on the latter course, as it will 
certainly enable more to be effected with the 
limited grant at my disposal for Militia purposes, 
than any other plan, though, had that grant been 
larger, I am not prepared to say that a measure 
having a larger field of operation would not have 
proved more beneficial. 
Caught in the middle between the Colonial Office 
pressing for greater provincial responsibility for 
self-defence and local opposition adverse to 
spending more money on the militia, Gordon 
concluded that the Camp of Instruction was the 
best possible arrangement, given the limited 
funds, for providing "real effective training."18 
The new Militia Act became law in late May 
1865, again placing New Brunswick in the 
forefront of the movement to reform the militia 
throughout British North America. As David 
Facey-Crowther pointed out in his study of the 
New Brunswick militia, Gordon's efforts "created 
for the province a militia system that the 
Dominion's new minister of militia [Sir George-
Etienne Cartier] was to call the best in Canada."19 
Despite the fact that the militia appropriation 
attached to the law was dramatically increased 
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to $30,000, the scale of the camp was to be 
reduced considerably.20 It was decided to hold 
the camp in Fredericton in early July. On 1 June 
the Adjutant General of the Militia, Lieutenant-
Colonel Thomas Anderson, issued orders to 
various battalions directing them to furnish a 
company for the camp, generally consisting of a 
captain, lieutenant, ensign, 60 privates and a 
bugler. The soldiers would receive a tunic and 
cap but were expected to furnish everything else, 
including clothes (pants, shirts and stockings), 
boots, towel and blanket, and eating utensils. 
Officers would supply their own uniform and 
equipment. 
Likely being aware of some of the misgivings 
about the camp, the Adjutant General further 
instructed: "It is desirable that the Men for the 
Camp should as far as possible be selected from 
people who are residing in the District, and not 
from the Migratory Population. "21 Commanding 
officers responded quickly to these orders and 
within a short time the quotas were filled by 
enthusiastic volunteers, without having to resort 
to the draft. The men were then organized into 
the companies that would attend the camp. 
The Camp of Instruction 
T he troops that entered the camp in Fredericton on 5 and 6 July came mainly 
from the various militia battalions of the central 
and southern counties of the province (Carleton, 
Charlotte, Kings, Queens, Saint John, Sunbury, 
and York). 22 Contingents also came from the 
Saint John Volunteers, the New Brunswick 
Regiment of Artillery and the New Brunswick 
Regiment ofYeomanry Cavalry. New Brunswick's 
railroad network was still in a rudimentary state 
in the mid 1860s, and so many of the troops 
followed a circuitous route to reach Fredericton. 
Those from the southern region railed to Saint 
John and Woodstock, and then boarded 
steamers for the trip along the St. John River, 
stopping as they went to pick up detachments 
at river landings. Within a few days 94 7 all ranks 
had gathered in the capital. 
Once assembled, most of the troops went into 
barracks provided by the recently constructed 
Exhibition Building of the Agricultural Society 
of York County at the corner of Saunders and 
York Streets at the rear of the city. The 
handsomely arched and domed building 
furnished comfortable quarters for about 620 
men. The ground floor provided sleeping space 
for many of the troops, as well as orderly rooms, 
paymaster's office, quartermaster's store, and 
reading room filled with books, magazines and 
copies of most of the province's newspapers. 
Some of the men also slept in berths located in 
the extensive galleries below the dome. Windows 
were removed to provide ventilation during the 
height of Fredericton's summer heat. The 
remainder of the troops stayed in the adjacent 
outbuildings. 
The officers either slept in town or in large 
tents set up on the surrounding grounds, which 
consisted of a three and a half acre show yard 
and a 50-acre level piece of ground ringed by a 
mile long race course that stretched south from 
behind the Exhibition Palace toward the foot of 
the heights behind the city and to the west past 
present-day Westmorland Street. The hospital 
marquee and medical officer's tent were located 
at the far end of the track. For the further 
e~oyrnent of the troops, a canteen that sold beer, 
porter and general store articles was set up by a 
Fredericton keeper just outside of the 
agricultural grounds. A sergeant was posted here 
to prevent drunkenness, and the authorities 
threatened the proprietor with heavy penalties 
if he sold spirits. 
The troops were formed into two active 
service battalions of seven companies, complete 
with field officers and staff, who ran the interior 
management of the battalions according to 
regular army standards. The first battalion was 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel the 
Honourable Lemuel Allan Wilmot, a Supreme 
Court justice and future lieutenant -governor, who 
commanded the 1st Battalion of the York County 
Militia based in Fredericton. The second 
battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
William T. Baird, who was commanding officer 
of the 1st Battalion of the Carleton County Militia 
located upriver in Woodstock and the deputy 
quartermaster general. 
In order to improve the overall training of 
the militia's officers corps- "the key stone of the 
entire Militia movement," according to General 
Doyle23 - additional officers were called for, and 
so 45 officers served as private soldiers in an 
"Officers Company" commanded by Lieutenant-
43 
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Many of the milita officers attending the Camp of Instruction slept in tents pitched on the extensive ground 
ringed by the Fredericton race course. 
Colonel the Honourable John Hamilton Gray, 
the attorney general and future Father of 
Confederation, who was also commanding officer 
of the Queen's New Brunswick Rangers from 
Loch Lomond near Saint John. The presence of 
this Officer's Company, together with the 
battalions' field and company officers, meant that 
a substantial number of the militia's officer corps 
were present at the camp. 24 
The camp staff and drill instructors were 
provided by the British regulars garrisoning the 
city, the 15th Regiment of Foot, and the provincial 
militia's permanent staff. They included a camp 
commandant, Capt. H.J. Hallowes of the 15th, 
serving with the temporary rank of lieutenant 
colonel of militia, quartermaster general, brigade 
major, paymaster and medical officer. 
The government furnished each soldier with 
a red flannel tunic and blue flannel forage cap, 
but each man wore his own trousers and boots. 
As J. W. Millidge, a Volunteer from a Saint John 
battery of the NB Regiment of Artillery, wrote 
sardonically this arrangement "did not always 
make for uniformity. "25 The gunners from the 
Regiment of Artillery wore blue tunics. Each man 
also received his rations, a straw mattress, a 
bolster or narrow pillow, field blanket and rifle 
rack. The volunteers were paid for the duration 
44 
of the camp, the amounts ranging from 50 cents 
a day for privates to $3.00 for field officers and 
adjutants, plus a dollar for forage. 
The training programme began almost at 
once and followed a progressive schedule. The 
troops began with basic drill, including facings, 
marching the goose step and forming fours. It 
was found that about two-thirds of them were 
completely undrilled and, of the remainder, only 
a few had received more than a week's 
instruction. Not surprisingly, the first few days 
of drill were difficult. On 7 July, the first full day 
of camp, the New Brunswick Reporter stated: 
"Of course they do not as yet present a very 
military appearance. Many of them are rather 
awkward, while some few have not music enough 
in their souls to learn to beat time, and will never 
make soldiers ... "26 
On the 1Oth and 11th each soldier received 
a rifle, bayonet and waist belt, and now "begins 
to feel himself a soldier. "27 For the next week they 
moved through more rigorous training. They 
began with manual exercises, where they were 
taught the 30 motions required to load and fire 
their weapons. At first, the drilling was 
interminable, but after a few days of counting, 
"the hammers came down with remarkable 
precision. "28 They then moved on to company 
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drill directed by drill instructors from the 15th 
or the most competent NCOs from among the 
volunteers. Simple battalion movements under 
command of their colonels then followed, when 
according to Millidge, the Saint John Volunteer 
artilleryman, "the fun commenced, companies 
finding themselves unexpectedly in awkward 
situations. "29 However, the troops quickly 
mastered the intricate movements, as the New 
Brunswick Reporter noted. 
One of the most difficult manoeuvres on parade 
is considered to be wheeling in solid column, 
and this was attempted on [the llth] by Col. 
Wilmot's battalion, the movement was steadily 
executed, the men came round beautifully, and 
during the wheel elicited the repeated 'well done' 
of their delighted commander. 30 
They also drilled briefly as a brigade consisting 
of the two militia battalions and the 15th 
Regiment under the commandant. 
On the 18th the troops' first major test came 
when the brigade was inspected by Governor 
Gordon and General Doyle, who was 
accompanied by the Marquis and Marchioness 
of Drogheda. The troops, "looking somewhat 
sun-bumt and weather stained, but all the more 
like their work," received the reviewing party with 
a general salute and march past. 31 Doyle then 
addressed the troops in complimentary terms. 
Training resumed with platoon exercises 
until the 22nd, when a grand review of the 
brigade was held. Hundreds of civilian onlookers 
watched as the brigade commanded Col. J. 
Amber Cole of the 15th marched past in quick 
time led by the regulars. Following this the 
volunteers formed two sides of a square and 
looked on as the 15th trooped the colour and 
presented bayonet exercises. The brigade then 
reassembled and carried out a long list of 
manoeuvres, including forming mass columns 
and wheeling into contiguous columns. 
Afterwards, Cole congratulated them on their 
conduct at camp, and assured them their 
performance on the parade ground equalled that 
of other militia regiments he had inspected. 32 
The brigade then marched back to barracks in 
close columns, "to the soul-inspiring music of 
the band. "33 
The busy schedule continued on the 24th, 
when the militia force and the band of the 15th 
participated in a March Out under the 
commandant. The troops filed out of the grounds 
led by the Officer's Company, which formed the 
advance guard and skirmished where the ground 
permitted a company to advance in extended 
order. They moved through town to the river 
bank, where they halted, piled arms and stood 
easy. After a time they returned to barracks. 
Over the last few days of the camp the 
volunteers heard a series of lectures on such 
subjects as the destructive power of the new arms 
that had replaced the Brown Bess and recent 
military events, including the Relief ofLucknow 
during the Indian Mutiny and the Defence of 
Kars. These lectures were supposed to show the 
volunteers what a small number of well-
disciplined troops under a gallant and 
Panoramic view of the camp training field. The militiamen forming square in the centre are framed by the 
hospital marquee in the foreground and the domed Exhibition Building in the background. 
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determined commander could accomplish under 
the most difficult circumstances.34 
On the 27th, the force assembled on the 
parade ground for the last time and then 
marched back to the Exhibition Building where 
they surrendered their rifles. They were then 
addressed by Governor Gordon who 
complimented them on their progress and their 
conduct in camp, and noted that he possessed 
officers whom he could look to confidently in an 
hour of need. 
The next day the troops marched to the river 
to board steamers for home. They were seen off 
by Col. Cole, the officers of the 15th and the 
citizens of Fredericton. 
How Successful was the Experiment? 
J1 t the time, the camp was seen generally as a 
~reat success. Gordon wrote to Cardwell, 
that the camp, "notwithstanding the many 
difficulties incident to a first attempt of the kind, 
was attended with even more complete success 
than I had, when most sanguine, ventured to 
anticipate."35 Cardwell later replied that, "Her 
Majesty's Government have observed with 
satisfaction the success which appears to have 
attended the Meeting of the first Camp under 
the provisions of the recent Militia law of the 
Province. "36 This might be considered high 
praise, given the tone of their correspondence a 
year earlier. Even the New Brunswick Reporter, 
which had strongly opposed holding the camp, 
wrote: 
Whether the late experiment will prove successful 
in its designs or not, it is satisfactory to state 
that the Volunteers have attained an astonishing 
proficiency in their drill, time being considered, 
and their exemplary conduct as a whole, taken 
as they were from all ranks of young men in New 
Brunswick, reflects the highest credit, not only 
on themselves, but on the Province at large. 37 
Clearly, many of the concerns raised before 
the troops assembled did not arise during the 
camp. First, the militiamen, seemingly displaying 
the spirit of patriotism and loyalty Cardwell had 
been calling for, came forward willingly in 
adequate numbers, thereby avoiding the negative 
consequences of having to draft men by ballot. 
Second, rather than being "birds of passage," 
46 
the men were "veritable sons of the soil," 
according to The Head Quarters. 38 In fact, they 
represented a rather select segment of the 
population. As Gordon noted, " ... the men 
generally who had volunteered for duty were 
permanent residents in the country, with fixed 
occupations and settled places of abode, and not 
drawn from the more migratory part of the 
population."39 Almost half of them listed their 
trade or occupation as farmer or farmer's son. 
The rest included everything from labourers and 
carpenters, to blacksmiths and shoemakers, 
clerks, students and some with no calling. Over 
a third were Anglican by religion, another quarter 
were Methodists and Baptists, and the rest were 
Presbyterians and Catholics. It is also likely that 
a significant number of them were literate.40 Nor 
did the experience contribute unduly to the men's 
immorality and drunkenness. Gordon, among 
others, noted that the troops were well-behaved 
and the provost sergeant was relatively inactiveY 
And finally, the camp was run very economically, 
with at least $8,500 left over from the province's 
$30,000 appropriation. 42 
Nevertheless, a closer analysis shows that 
some of the weaknesses endemic to the militia 
force of the period surfaced at the camp. First. 
the troops who attended the camp did not 
represent the entire province as had been called 
for by the militia commission. Because of the 
financial constraints imposed by the province, 
Gordon decided to collect the force from those 
counties that were within easy access of 
Fredericton. Therefore, those present came 
mainly from the Western District, representing 
the central and southern portions of the 
province, and the eastern and northern units, 
especially from the francophone areas, were 
absent. 43 This also meant that the size of the 
force was less than half the number 
recommended by the commission. Consequently, 
the benefits of the training were confined to only 
part of the province's militia force. 
Second was the level and nature of their 
training. The camp routine made allowance for 
much training at all levels, and many of the 
troops achieved a high degree of proficiency in a 
short time, especially those companies that had 
an experienced officer or drill instructor attached 
to them. 44 However, the officers reviewing the 
troops, perhaps detecting an exaggerated sense 
of accomplishment, but not wanting to dampen 
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spirits, hinted that their training was still at a 
basic level. On the 18th, Doyle congratulated the 
troops on the competence of their drill, but in 
comparing them to the Nova Scotia militia he 
stated: "Now, I cannot say that you excel them, 
but this I may say, that you come so near them 
that I think you must be their first cousins."45 
Similarly, Col. Cole of the 15th qualified his 
remarks by stating that the militia's performance 
on the 22nd equalled that of other troops he had 
inspected that had been called out "for ordinary 
stark contrast to the Fredericton camp. Every 
ten days four or five militia battalions arrived in 
camp to receive light infantry training and 
practical field instruction, learning, for example, 
how to strike, pitch and pack tents. They also 
fired 20 rounds of blank ammunition by file and 
volley, and were taught how to move with the 
regulars across country to attack strong 
positions. The camp was organized by Colonel 
Garnet Wolseley, the Assistant-Quartermaster-
General of the British troops in Canada, who 
wrote, "My chief aim was to afford officers and 
Militiamen practice forming square on the training field. 
training - I do not mean permanently 
embodied. "46 
More importantly, although the troops were 
taught to manoeuvre alongside the regulars in a 
brigade formation, it appears that most of the 
movements, such as forming squares, were 
based on conventional tactics that would likely 
be of limited use in British North America. This 
was made especially clear by the recent American 
experience on the battlefield, where modern 
weaponry compelled them to experiment with 
new tactics based on fire and movement and field 
entrenchments. Nor is there any indication that 
the troops gained real familiarity with their 
weapons by engaging in musketry practice or 
sham battles using blank ammunition. 
The camp of training and observation held 
in Thorold, Ontario a year later in the wake of 
the debacle at the Battle of Ridgeway stands in 
men instruction in the practical work which real 
war presents, and to avoid repeating drill-book 
manoeuvres which never could be required in 
Canada such as forming squares, etc. "47 
As well, training in Fredericton was limited 
exclusively to the infantry. Contingents from the 
NB Regiment of Artillery attended with four 
cannon, but aside from the review on the 18th, 
when they demonstrated their gun drill, they 
trained mostly as foot soldiers.48 Similarly, the 
mounted cavalry was no where in evidence, and 
they too trained as infantry. 49 A chief weakness 
of the militia had always been that it was 
predominantly an infantry force and the camp 
did little to redress this imbalance. Third was 
their standards of fitness and discipline. Several 
observers noted that the men remained quite fit 
throughout the camp and the doctors had little 
to keep them busy.50 And as was noted above, 
the troops were well-behaved both while in camp 
47 
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as well as in town, despite provocations from 
some of Fredericton's young men. 51 
However, these observations glossed over 
some problems. If the sick list was short, it is 
also evident that not everyone could withstand 
the rigorous training; for as the camp 
quartermaster general noted, by the end of the 
camp more than 60 men had been discharged 
under medical certificates as being unfit for 
duty. 52 Their march discipline also left something 
to be desired, as was seen on their March Out 
on the 24th. It was an excessively hot day and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, they did not march in 
good order. As Col. Baird pointed out, when the 
troops halted by the river, they made a mad dash 
to gulp down water, loosing equipment in the 
process. The disorder continued on the return 
march. Alluding to the Union army's recent drive 
to the sea through Georgia and the Carolinas, 
Baird wrote: 
the break from Sherman's ranks, in his 
celebrated march through Virginia [sic] on the 
hen roosts and piggeries, were cast in the shade 
by the raid of our fellows on the wells and springs 
in the line ofmarch ... paper shirt collars strewed 
the road ... and when at two and a half miles below 
Fredericton the command 'Halt, front' was given, 
the idea to officers of the straggling of an army 
was fairly understood. 53 
Finally, although the camp took on the routine 
of the regular army, it is apparent, Gordon's 
claim notwithstanding, that the standards of 
camp discipline for the volunteers were 
considerably relaxed. Millidge recalled: 
. . . one day, a captain of a rural company came to 
the Commandant, in a state of great excitement, 
saying that one of his men had just deserted, 
and wanting to know what was to be done. 
'Nothing,' said the Commandant, 'let him go.'54 
The fourth subject of concern was the level 
of training and leadership skills possessed by 
the officers of the militia. Millidge, for one, was 
very skeptical about Gordon's assessment ofthe 
quality of his militia officers. He stated that the 
tactical knowledge of the battalion commanders 
"left much to be desired," and concluded that 
the governor's generous comments "led us to 
believe that he was either saying the thing that 
was not, or that he had seen very little of this 
country's defenders."55 
48 
However, Gordon was not blind to some of 
the weaknesses still facing the militia's officer 
corps. Despite the large numbers of officers 
present at the camp from some units, Gordon 
himself noted the absence of many others and 
cautioned in his Militia General Order No. 43 
issued at the end of the camp: 
that the Officers of the Militia at large will not 
neglect the opportunity afforded them of 
becoming acquainted with their duties, and His 
Excellency desires it to be distinctly understood 
that the acceptance of a Commission renders it 
obligatory on the individual accepting it to qualify 
himself for the duties it imposes. 56 
It is very likely that some of the observers 
simply decided to ignore or downplay many of 
the same problems that had affected the militia 
force for years, and instead chose to praise their 
finer qualities, perhaps excessively and 
misleadingly. 
What were the longer-term effects of the 
camp? In the fall of 1865 many ofthe Volunteer 
and militia units were called out. For example, 
Millidge noted that after the camp he joined the 
Saint John County Militia and in the autumn 
his battalion attempted to put into practice what 
had been learned in Fredericton. Bills were 
posted everywhere ordering the militia to muster, 
and uniforms, weapons and equipment were 
gathered up. He noted that nearly 2,000 troops 
assembled throughout the district and the rolls 
were called. The officers then put them through 
basic company and battalion drill. 57 Militia 
officials drew at least two conclusions from these 
turnouts . 
First, there was little doubt that the numbers 
of men parading in the above example was very 
impressive and an important longer-lasting effect 
of the camp was the boost it gave to militia 
recruitment and turnout. As Gordon observed: 
I am convinced that, apart from the instruction 
(by no means inconsiderable) which Officers and 
Men have received, a vast amount of popular 
prejudice has been dissipated, and spirit 
introduced into the Districts from which the men 
were drawn, which will be productive of the best 
results. 58 
Nevertheless, this impressive display was not 
uniform throughout the province. For instance, 
on 4 October, the Class A companies of the active 
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The brigade, consisting of the 15th Regiment (at left) and the two militia service battalions, being inspected, 
probably during the review by General Doyle and Governor Gordon on 18 July 1865. (PANBP5163) 
militia from Fredericton and the surrounding 
districts of York County mustered for the purpose 
of calling the roll and ascertaining numbers. 
Some of the companies assembled in good 
numbers, but others had hardly quarter 
strength. Moreover, some officers appeared in 
uniform according to regulations, while others 
were without any badge of rank. 59 In fact, a close 
analysis of the annual inspection report of 
Volunteer companies reveals uneven results. 60 
The units from the Eastern District, which were 
not present at camp, were small in numbers, 
although they had some new recruits who had 
joined recently. As well, some of the units from 
the Western District that had been represented 
at camp also had low turnouts compared with 
the actual strength of the unit. For example, 
Lieutenant-Colonel George Maunsell, the Acting 
Adjutant General, noted that attendance at the 
Sunbury County Militia company's turnout was 
low because many of the men were absent in the 
woods. Clearly, the camp had had positive effects 
on annual inspection callouts in some cases, but 
in others they remained strictly limited, and 
uneven attendance continued to plague the 
militia force even after Confederation. 
As was seen above, although not stated 
explicitly, it was assumed generally that the 
troops were supposed to return home with 
knowledge and skills they could pass on to their 
comrades who were unable to attend camp. How 
successful were the troops in imparting useful 
military training over the long-term? Maunsell 
concluded that this objective had been met 
successfully. He wrote: 
During my tour of inspection in the Western 
District, I observed with much satisfaction the 
benefits derived from instruction received at the 
Camp oflnstruction at Fredericton. Members of 
Companies who previous to joining the Camp, 
had some knowledge of drill, are now enabled 
by practical experience to impart instruction to 
others; whilst of those who had no such previous 
knowledge, many have displayed a remarkable 
aptitude for its acquisition, and interest in 
maintaining it when acquired. 61 
A commendable example of this process in 
action was provided by the 3rd Battalion of the 
Kings' County Militia, which was inspected by 
its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Andrew C. Otty in late September. Otty, who had 
been a member of the militia commission and 
second-in-command of the 1st Service Battalion 
at the camp, did his best to pass on the benefits 
of the training learned in Fredericton to the rest 
of his troops. Following the inspection, he called 
out the men who had been on duty at the camp 
and exercised them as a company in the presence 
of the battalion. He was pleased to find, he 
informed the Adjutant General, that "they had 
not forgotten that which they had acquired at 
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The 15th Regiment on parade, probably during the trooping of the colour on 22 July 1865. The regimental 
band stands at the left, while the militiamen look on in the lfj'tforeground. (PANBPS/66) 
Camp." Moreover, on his own initiative Otty 
invited two other area units - the Sussex Rifles 
and Saunders' Mounted Rifles - to join his 
battalion for a field day. He formed them into a 
large corps and put them through various 
infantry evolutionS. 52 
However, it is unlikely that many others 
followed Otty's example. The York County 
Militia's callout was only for mustering, and 
Millidge's unit's turnout was probably too large 
to have learned much in a single day. Again, the 
inspection report revealed mixed results. The 
level of training found in some units, especially 
among the more technically specialized units like 
the artillery and engineers, was high, although 
it was difficult to link this to the camp, there 
being only one direct example of camp 
instruction being passed on to the other troops 
being cited. However, the state of training in some 
units, especially in the eastern and rural areas 
was indifferent. It was very likely therefore, that 
some of these turnouts were not much more 
successful than the muster days of the sedentary 
militia of the earlier period. 
Indeed, Doyle, despite his praise for the 
camp, questioned what lasting effects the camp 
would have on the active militia. At the end of 
August, he cautioned Gordon that, 
50 
further exertions are necessary to place the Militia 
of the Province generally in condition to defend 
their homes ... No doubt great advantage has been 
derived by the return to their homes of those 
who were instructed in the Camp at 
Fredericton ... by arousing a popular feeling in 
favour of the Militia ... That object having been 
gained, I should wish to impress upon Your 
Excellency the necessity of affording instruction 
to the whole of the Militia in New Brunswick ... 
Doyle believed that until more money could be 
raised to train a larger body of the militia the 
province remained in a "comparatively 
defenceless state. "63 
Moreover, the force continued to face 
problems related to training that camps of 
instruction could not solve, in particular the 
absence of proper drilling facilities and modern 
weapons and equipment. This situation 
prompted the inspector of the artillery regiment 
to conclude that "for all practical purposes, the 
force, as it is at present constituted, would be 
but a broken reed in an emergency."64 
In the event, these warnings about the 
continued shortcomings of the militia and the 
relatively defenceless state of the province were 
put to the test in April 1866, when the Fenian 
crisis struck New Brunswick. 65 After months of 
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rumours and alarms about an impending 
descent on the province, members of the 
Brotherhood burned the customs house on 
Indian Island in the Bay of Fundy in mid April. 
Subsequent raids were turned back by the 
combined forces of the regulars and Volunteers, 
and by the end of May the crisis had passed. 
During this emergency the government 
followed the old colonial tradition used to turn 
back the threat from the south of relying on the 
regulars stationed in the province as well as army 
and navy reinforcements called in from Halifax, 
augmented by the Volunteers and militia. Gordon 
called out on active service a force of about 1,000 
Volunteers from several battalions and organized 
some of the militia into home guards. At Saint 
John and several stations along the frontier, 
including St. Stephen and Woodstock, the New 
Brunswickers stood guard and drilled, 
performing their defensive duties admirably. 
However, despite the Adjutant General's claim 
that the crisis had put the Volunteer system "to 
a severe test," and that it had "come up to the 
expectations of its most ardent admirers, and 
proved of infinite value in the hour ofneed,"66 it 
was hardly a true test of their efficiency and 
training. 
In the light of this cns1s, the continued 
inadequacies ofthe province's defences became 
clear and over the next year this helped to move 
New Brunswick, as well as the rest of British 
North America, toward Confederation and its 
promise of common defence, as a more realistic 
response to the security needs of the country. As 
John Hamilton Gray, a provincial delegate to the 
Charlottetown Conference and the commanding 
officer of the Officer's Company at the 1865 
camp, wrote the Fenian scare "essentially proved 
the necessity of that military organization which, 
it was alleged, would spring from 
Confederation. "67 
Conclusion 
Clearly, the vast experiment of the Fredericton Camp oflnstruction had been an impressive 
achievement. Despite its novel nature, the camp 
was thoroughly organized and efficiently run, 
laying to rest much of the opposition levelled at 
it. In the short-term it had provided those 
militiamen who attended the camp with a degree 
of intensive training and, more generally, had 
increased enthusiasm for militia service in some 
places. If its broader purpose was to provide a 
cadre of trained militiamen who would pass on 
their new knowledge to their comrades, however, 
its success had been more limited. Moreover, it 
was also apparent that, despite several years of 
reform, many of the traditional problems facing 
the militia still existed. 
Perhaps it would have been unrealistic to 
have expected anything other than this outcome. 
As Gordon himself stated, a month-long camp 
for a select portion of the active militia was the 
only real alternative open to him, given the 
shortage of funds, and it was only part of an 
ongoing programme aimed at upgrading the 
overall effectiveness of the militia. 
Nevertheless, militia officials continued to 
see value in the camp system in 1866. The 
Adjutant General wrote: 
A desire appears to exist amongst all ranks of 
the Militia for further advancement in the 
knowledge and practice of military duties. This 
desire has increased during the past two years, 
chiefly by the results of the Camp of Instruction; 
although it may not have met the expectations of 
all. .. it cannot be doubted that the Camp of 
Instruction has been a means of diffusing a good 
practical knowledge of drill throughout the 
Province, and showing the system by which the 
interior economy of a Battalion is conducted, to 
those who otherwise would have no opportunity 
of obtaining such information. 68 
So in the last year before Confederation, the 
government decided to repeat the experiment, 
although on a reduced scale and with certain 
modifications. The 1866 Camp of Instruction 
was held at Camp Torryburn near Saint John in 
late June.69 The turnout numbered only 450 
men, less than half the numbers assembled in 
Fredericton. However, some lessons had been 
learned from the first camp. In particular, the 
limited geographic representation of the 1865 
camp was rectified, with several contingents 
attending from the Eastern District. 70 As well, 
this camp moved toward the kind of approach 
called for by the critics of the 1865 experiment, 
in that a much larger number of officers attended 
camp (305 in total), with one of the two 
battalions being composed entirely of officers 
selected from every battalion in the province. The 
lieutenant-governor was particularly pleased 
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with the turnout and performance of the officers 
at camp, writing: 
That Officers, -many of them well advanced in 
years - some of them Field Officers in the Militia 
- two actually in command of Regiments, and 
nearly all engaged in professional pursuits from 
which their presence could now ill be spared, 
should cheerfully devote a month to learn their 
duties, and submit to the restraint and drill of 
private soldiers, must be a source of gratification 
to all who desire the Militia to become of practical 
utility and a means of safety to the Province. 71 
However, this would be the last time the 
camp system was employed in the province. In 
1867, summer training for the militia was held 
on a much reduced scale, and it would be many 
years before the post-Confederation Canadian 
militia undertook regular training on the scale 
of the New Brunswick Militia's 1865 Camp of 
Instruction. 72 
Notes 
1. Lieutenant Governor Arthur Hamilton Gordon to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Edward Cardwell, 14 
August 1865, Journals of the House of Assembly q[New 
Brunswick (JHA) ( 1866), p.26. See also William T. Baird, 
Seventy Years of New Brunswick Life -Autobiographical 
Sketches (Saint John, NB: Geo. E. Day. 1890; repr. by 
St. Annes Point Press, 1978), p.240. For a more 
contemporary statement of this view, see Douglas How, 
The 8th Hussars: A History of the Regtment (Sussex, 
NB: Maritime Publishing, 1964), p.23. 
2. J .K. Chapman, The Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon, 
First Lord Stanmore, 1829-1912 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1964), pp.21-22. For a detailed 
examination of Gordon's reforms, see David Facey-
Crowther, The New Brunswick Militia, 1787-1867 
(Fredericton, NB: New Ireland Press and the New 
Brunswick Historical Society, 1990), pp.92-119. 
3. Facey-Crowther, New Brunswick Militia, p.1 01. 
4 Although these companies had special status and received 
separate funds, they nevertheless formed an integral part 
of the battalion to which they belonged, and came under 
the control of the battalion commander. 
5. A detailed breakdown of the numbers of troops in each 
class can be found in "Report on the Militia of the Province 
ofNewBrunswickforthe YearEnding31 October 1864," 
JHA. (1865), pp.4 and 23; and C.F. Hamilton, "The 
Canadian Militia: The Maritime Provinces," Canadian 
D!ifence Quarterly, VI (October, 1928 to July, 1929), 
pp.475-76. 
6. Facey-Crowther, New Brunswick Militia, p.112. 
7. Gordon to Cardwell, 21 November 1864, JHA. (1865), 
p.43. See also, "Report on the Militia of the Province of 
52 
New Brunswick for the Year Ending 31 October 1864," 
p.6. 
8. For more detail on the imperial context, see Facey-
Crowther, New Brunswick Militia, pp. 103-4, 112-13. 
9. Cardwell to Gordon, 1 October 1864, JHA, (1865), p.41. 
10. Gordon to Cardwell, 21 November 1864, JHA, (1865}, 
p.44. 
11. Cardwell to Gordon, 10 December 1864, JHA, (1865), 
p.44. 
12. See "Report of the Militia Commission," JHA, (1865), 
pp.45-4 7. The report did not state clearly which classes 
of the active militia were eligible for training; it is assumed 
here that the camp volunteers came from all classes of 
the active force. 
13. "Report of the Militia Commission," p.45. 
14. For example, the Adjutant General wrote that the camp 
"will be of great value in providing men, not only drilled 
themselves, but capable of imparting instruction to 
others ... " "Report on the Militia of the Province of New 
Brunswick for the Year Ending 31 October 1864," p. 5. 
It is likely that Gordon was himself the originator of 
the idea of a lengthy Camp of Instruction. In mid-
November 1864, six weeks before he convened the militia 
commission, he wrote to Cardwell that "It is my intention 
to propose to my advisors before the next meeting of the 
Provincial Parliament, a scheme ... which will have for its 
object the training of a certain portion of the Militia for 
several consecutive days in each year." Gordon to 
Cardwell, 21 November 1864, JHA, (1865), p.44. 
15. New Brunswick Reporter, 16 June 1865, p.2; 7 July 
1865, p.2; and 14July 1865, p.2. 
16. Major General Sir Hastings Doyle to Gordon, 30 August 
1865, JHA. (1866), p.198. 
17. RG 7, G8B, vol. 45, Minutes from the Inspectors General 
of Militia and Volunteers, 16 and 18 February 1865. 
18. Gordon to Cardwell, 3 July 1865, JHA. (1866), p.195. 
19. Facey-Crowther, New Brunswick Militia, pp.93, 111 and 
130. 
20. Section 24 of the Act stated: "Companies of the Active 
Militia, to the number of at least fifteen, shall be annually 
exercised at such convenient time and place as may be 
appointed by the Commander in Chief." See "An Act 
relating to the Militia," in Acts of the General Assembly, 
(1865), p.15. 
21. Lieutenant -Colonel Thomas Anderson, Adjutant General 
of Militia, to Lieutenant-Colonel Otty. Commanding 3rd 
Kings' Regiment. 1 June 1865, Letter Book of the Kings' 
Co. Militia, 3rd Battalion, 1862-1869, pp. 73-74, Records 
of the New Brunswick Militia, RG 1 Reel RS 599. 
22. The following description of the camp is based on the 
"Report of the Commandant of the Camp oflnstruction 
to His Excellency the Hon. Arthur H. Gordon, 
Commander-in-Chief." 5 August 1865, JHA, (1866), 
pp.ll-20. 
23. Doyle to Gordon, 30 August 1865, JHA. ( 1866), p.198. 
24. In his Militia General Order of 27 July, the Governor 
singled out the 3rd Battalion of the King's County Militia, 
who had 14 of their 25 officers in attendance. See "Militia 
General Order, No. 43," 27 July 1865. JHA, (1866), p.21. 
25. Rev. J.W. Millidge, "Events of the Decade, 1860-1870," 
Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society," 
IV. (1919), p.322. 
26. NB Reporter, 7 July 1865, p.2. 
27. Baird, Seventy Years of New Brunswick Life, p.232. 
28. Ibid., p.232. 
29. Millidge, "Events of the Decade," p.323. 
14
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss2/5
30. NB Reporter; 14 July 1865, p.2. 
31. The Head Quarters, 19 July 1865. 
32. The Head Quarters, 26 July 1865. 
33. Baird, Seventy Years of New Brunswick Life, p.235. 
34. Ibid., p.237. 
35. Gordon to Cardwell, 14August 1865, JHA, (1866), p.195. 
36. RG G8B, vol. 45, Cardwell to Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings 
Doyle, 29 September 1865. 
37. NB Reporter, 28 July 1865, p.2. 
38. The Head Quarters, 16 August 1865, p.2. 
39. Gordon to Cardwell, l4August1865,JHA. (1866), p.196. 
40. Among the camp facilities provided for the troops was a 
well-stocked reading room. According to William Baird, 
the troops made considerable use of the room. See Baird, 
Seventy Years of New Brunswick Life, pp.230-31. 
41. In his Militia General Order, Gordon noted, "I cannot 
speak too highly of the general conduct of the Force. 
Insubordination and drunkenness were almost unknown; 
the number of absentees at tattoo did not average more 
than two, and they usually came in shortly afterwards. 
The willingness of the men to learn, their aptitude in 
learning, and their ready and cheerful submission to the 
necessary discipline, (which was carefully enforced) I own 
surprised me ... " "Militia General Order, No. 43," JHA, 
(1866), pp.20 and 22. 
According to the commandant's report, the average 
daily number of prisoners in each battalion was not more 
than two, and the crimes were relatively minor, with 
punishment consisting of stoppage of pay or confinement 
to barracks. "Report of the Commandant." p.l4. 
42. The HeadQuarters, l6August 1865, p.2. 
43. Gordon to Cardwell, 14August 1865,JHA, (1866), p.195. 
By 1865, units of varying strengths existed in Albert, 
Gloucester, Kent, Northumberland, Resttgouche, Victoria 
and Westmorland Counties. By a rough count, they would 
have made up about a third of the militia battalions in 
the province. 
44. "Report of the Commandant," p.l5. 
45. The Head Quarters, 19 July 1865. 
46. The Head Quarters, 26 July 1865. 
47. Quoted in Brereton Greenhous, Semper Paratus: The 
History of The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
(Wentworth Regiment) 1862-1977 (Hamilton, ON: RHLI 
Historical Association, 1977). For details on the 
controversial subject of Civil War tactics, see Grady 
McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack andDte: Civil 
War Mititary Tactics and the Southern Heritage 
(University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1982); 
and Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New 
Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1989). 
48. The Head Quarters. 19 July 1865. 
49. How, The 8th Hussars, p.24. 
50. "ReportoftheCommandant,"JHA. (1866), p.13; Gordon 
to Cardwell, 14August 1865, JHA, (1866), p.197. 
51. The Head Quarters. 14 July 1865. 
52. Captain Moody to Colonel Hallowes, 4 August 1865, JHA, 
(1866). p.18. 
53. Baird, Seventy Years of New Brunswick Ltfe, p.237. 
54. Millidge. "Events of the Decade," p.323. 
55. Ibid., p.323. 
56. "Militia General Order, No. 43," JHA. (1866), p.2l. 
57. Millidge, "Events of the Decade," p.234. 
58. Gordon to Cardwell, 14August 1865,JHA, (1866), p.197. 
59. The Head Quarters, 4 October 1865, p.2. 
60. See "Inspection Report of the Volunteer Companies of the 
New Brunswick Militia, 1865,"JHA, (1866), pp.33-42. 
61. "Report upon the Militia of New Brunswick, for the Year 
Ending 31st October 1865," JHA. (1866), p.5. 
62. Otty to Lieutenant-Colonel George Maunsell, Acting 
Adjutant General of Militia, 1 November 1865, Letter 
Book of the Kings' Co. Militia, 3rd Battalion, 1862-1869, 
p.87, Records of the New Brunswick Militia, RG 1 Reel 
RS599. 
63. Doyle to Gordon. 30 August 1865, JHA, (1866), p.199. 
64. "Inspection Report of the Volunteer Companies of the New 
Brunswick Militia. 1865," p.37. 
65. For a detailed description of the military dimensions of 
the Fenian crisis in New Brunswick, see Facey-Crowther, 
The New Brunswick Militia, pp.119-28. 
66. "Report on the Militia of New Brunswick, 1866," JHA, 
(1867), p.5. 
67. Quoted in George F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soidters: The 
Military History of an Unmilitary People 3rd. ed. 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), p.233; on the link between 
the Fenians and Confederation in New Brunswick, see 
W.S. MacNutt, New Brunswick, A HiStory: 1784-1867 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1984), ch.16, especially p.450. 
68. "Report on the Militia of New Brunswick, 1866," JHA. 
(1867), p.10. 
69. The following description is based on the "Report of the 
Commandant of the Camp of Instruction," JHA, ( 1867), 
pp.35-45. 
70. They included a battalion contingent from Albert County, 
two each from Northumberland and Kent, and three from 
Westmorland County. 
71. "Militia General Orders, No. 48," 23 July 1866, JHA 
(1867), p.44. 
72. In the early 1870s, many units trained for the full sixteen 
days authorized by the Militia Act of 1868, and in 1872 
experimental 6,000-man divisional camps were held. 
However. declining Interest in the militia and an ongoing 
economic crisis forced a drastic curtailment in training. 
In 1876 summer camps were abolished, leaving city units 
to train eight days a year locally, while rural units virtually 
ceased training. See Stephen J. Harris, "Confederation 
to the Boer War." in John Marteinson, We Stand On 
Guard: An Illustrated HiStory of the Canadian Army 
(Montreal: Ovale, 1992), pp.38-40. 
J. Brent Wilson is the Senior Researcher at 
the Centre for Conflict Studies at the 
University of New Brunswick and Manuscript 
Editor of The Journal of Conflict Studies. 
He also teaches military history courses in 
the Department of History at UNB. He is co-
editor of Military History and the Military 
Profession (1992). and The Soldier and the 
Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-Military 
Relations? ( 1996). 
53 
15
Wilson: “The Vast Experiment”: The New Brunswick Militia’s 1865 Camp of I
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1997
